Estoppel, Equitable -


[1] Elements and Case Citations

(1) A representation by defendant (the party estopped), to plaintiff (the party claiming estoppel) as to a material fact;

(2) The representation is contrary to the condition of affairs later asserted by defendant;

(3) Plaintiff relies on the representation; and

(4) Plaintiff suffers detriment by a change in position as a result of the representation and reliance thereon.

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Florida State Cases

Supreme Court: Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. S.A.P, 835 So. 2d 1091, 1096-97 (Fla. 2002)

First District: State, Dept. of Revenue ex rel. Dees v. Petro, 765 So.2d 792, 793 (Fla.1^st DCA 2000)

Second District: Winans v. Weber, No. 2D06-5581, 2007 WL 4355249, *4 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 14, 2007)

Third District: Rayborn v. Dept. of Mgmt., 803 So. 2d 747, 748 (Fla. 3^rd DCA 2001)

Fourth District: Sun Cruz Casinos LLC v. City of Hollywood, Florida, M.R., 844 So.2d 681, 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)

Fifth District: Goodwin v. Blu Murray Ins. Agency, Inc., 939 So. 2d 1098, 1103 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2006)

Florida Federal Cases

Eleventh Circuit: Whetstone Candy Co. Inc. v. Kraft Food, Inc., 351 F.3d 1067, 1076 (11th Cir. 2003)

Southern District: In re Hawkins, 377 B.R. 761, 770 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007)

Middle District: BP Prods. N. Am., Inc. v. Oakridge at Winegard, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134 (M.D. Fla. 2007)

Northern District: Villas of Lake Jackson v. Leon County, 906 F. Supp. 1509, 1530 (N.D. Fla. 1995)

Florida Rules

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) (general rules of pleading; estoppel as affirmative defense)

References

Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 552, 894 (1979)

[2] Defenses to Claim for Equitable Estoppel

(1) Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) (pleading affirmative defenses), and other standard defenses. See § 60.

(2) Statute of Limitations: § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (four years) (Florida courts have not addressed the applicable statute of limitations for estoppel claims).

(3) Equitable estoppel requires proof of fraud, misrepresentation or deception. See Lennar Homes v. Gabb Const. Services, 654 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

(4) The promisee had knowledge of, or reasonable ability to learn, the true facts. See Irvine v. Cargill Investor Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986).

(5) The representation must be definite and specific, and not susceptible to multiple interpretations. See Irvine v. Cargill Investor Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986).

(6) Courts may only employ equitable estoppel to prohibit the perpetration of fraud. See Lennar Homes v. Gabb Const. Servs., 654 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

(7) The promisee cannot base an estoppel claim against the state for mistaken statements of law. See Warren v. Dept. of Admin., 554 So. 2d 568, 571 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).

(8) Estoppel is not a judicial counteraction to the statute of frauds. Bergman v. DeIulio, 826 So.2d 500, 504 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2002)(citations omitted).

(9) "[A] truthful statement as to the present intention of a party with regard to his future act is not the foundation upon which an estoppel may be built." S. Inv. Corp. v. Norton, 57 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1952).

(10) A claim of reliance must fail where both parties have equal knowledge of the truth. Watson Clinic, LLP v. Verzosa, 816 So.2d 832 , 834 (Fla. 2^nd DCA 2002)