Estoppel, Equitable -

[1] Elements and Case Citations
(1) A representation by defendant (the party
estopped), to plaintiff (the party claiming estoppel) as to a material fact;
(2) The representation is contrary to the condition of affairs later asserted by
defendant;
(3) Plaintiff relies on the representation; and
(4) Plaintiff suffers detriment by a change in
position as a result of the representation and reliance thereon.
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Florida State Cases
Supreme Court: State v. Harris, 881 So. 2d 1079, 1084 (Fla. 2004)
First District: Mobile Med. Indus. v. Quinn, 985 So.2d 33, 35-36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
Second District: Winans v. Weber, No. 2D06-5581, 2007 WL 4355249, *4 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 14, 2007)
Third District:Flagship Resort Dev. Corp. v. Interval Intern., Inc., 28 So.3d 915, 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).
Fourth District: Lloyds Underwriters at London v. Keystone Equip. Fin. Corp., 25 So.3d 89, 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
Fifth District: Goodwin v. Blu Murray Ins. Agency, Inc., 939 So. 2d 1098, 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
Florida Federal Cases
Eleventh Circuit: Martin v. Brevard County Pub. Sch., 543 F.3d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2008).
Southern District: BP Products North America Inc. v. Super Stop No. 701, Inc., 2009 WL 5068599, *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2009).
Middle District: Chick-Fil-A, Inc. v. CFT Dev., LLC, 652 F.Supp.2d 1252, 1261 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
Northern District: Perdido Sun Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 545 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1234 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
Florida Rules
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) (general rules of pleading; estoppel as affirmative defense)
References
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 552, 894 (1979)
[2] Defenses to Claim
for Equitable Estoppel
(1) Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) (pleading affirmative defenses), and other
standard defenses. See § 60.
(2) Statute of Limitations: § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (four years)
(Florida courts have not addressed the applicable statute of limitations for estoppel claims).
(3) Equitable estoppel requires proof of fraud, misrepresentation or deception.
See Lennar Homes v. Gabb Const. Services, 654 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
(4) The promisee had knowledge of, or reasonable ability to learn, the true facts.
See Irvine v. Cargill Investor Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986).
(5) The representation must be definite and specific, and not susceptible to
multiple interpretations. See Irvine v. Cargill Investor Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986).
(6) Courts may only employ equitable estoppel to prohibit the perpetration of
fraud. See Lennar Homes v. Gabb Const. Servs., 654 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
(7) The promisee cannot base an estoppel claim against the state for mistaken
statements of law. See Warren v. Dept. of Admin., 554 So. 2d 568, 571 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
(8) Estoppel is not a judicial counteraction to the statute of frauds.
Bergman v. DeIulio, 826 So.2d 500, 504 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(citations omitted).
(9) "[A] truthful statement as to the present intention of a party with regard to his future act
is not the foundation upon which an estoppel may be built."
S. Inv. Corp. v. Norton, 57 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1952).
(10) A claim of reliance must fail where both parties have equal knowledge of
the truth. Watson Clinic, LLP v. Verzosa, 816 So.2d 832 , 834 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002)