(1) Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d) (pleading affirmative defenses): a party must set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, waiver, and any other matter constituting avoidance or an affirmative defense.

(2) Accord and satisfaction requires (a) a preexisting dispute between the parties, (b) the parties’ mutual intent to settle the dispute by agreement, and (c) the tender and acceptance of a settlement agreement as full satisfaction and discharge of the parties disputed obligation. Chassan Professional Wallcovering, Inc. v. Victor Frankel, Inc., 608 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 4th 1992); see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(3) Arbitration and Award: the right to compel arbitration is waived when the defendant fails to demand arbitration and instead answers the complaint, even when the right to arbitration is asserted as an affirmative defense. See Bared and Co., v. Specialty Maintenance and Construction, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(4) Assumption of the risk precludes recovery when the plaintiff voluntarily consented to exposure to the injury-causing harm. See Kuehner v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1983); see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(5) Collateral Estoppel precludes re-litigation of issues when the identical issue has been litigated between the same parties. See Florida Bar v. Clement, 662 So. 2d 690, 697 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1210 (1996); Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 853 So.2d 1125, 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(6) Contributory Negligence. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1973) (abolishing contributory negligence as complete bar to recovery in favor of comparative negligence; see § 768.81, Fla. Stat.; see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(7) Corporate Veil: plaintiffs cannot pierce the corporate veil to hold a corporation’s shareholders individually liable for the corporation’s debts absent a showing "that the corporation was organized or employed to mislead creditors or to work a fraud upon them". See Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 1984).

(8) Discharge in Bankruptcy. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 727 (Chapter 7 Debtor), 1141(d) (Chapter 11 Debtor), 1228 (Chapter 12 Debtor), 1328 (Chapter 13 Debtor); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(9) Duress is severe pressure or other influence that destroys the defendant’s free will and forces the defendant to do an act or enter into a contract. See Franklin v. Wallock, 576 So. 2d 1371, 1373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (J. Sharp, dissenting); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(10) Equitable Estoppel “is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property or of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, or of contract or of remedy." Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001).

(11) Equitable Tolling may delay the running of the statue of limitations “based on the plaintiff’s blameless ignorance and lack of prejudice to the defendant. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076, n. 11 (Fla. 2001).

(12) Failure of Consideration. See Vichaikul v. S.C.A.C. Enters., Inc. 616 So. 2d 100, 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(13) Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies: a plaintiff cannot seek judicial relief when a statute or employment contract requires the plaintiff to first seek relief through an administrative process or forum. See Bal Harbour Village v. City of North Miami, 678 So. 2d 356, 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

(14) Failure to Satisfy Prima Facie Elements: the plaintiff’s inability to satisfy one or more of the prima facie elements of a claim is an absolute bar to that claim. See Donald S. Zuckerman, P.A. v. Alex Hofrichter, 676 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

(15) Fraud. See § 26, discussing the elements of fraud; see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above. Further, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.120(b) mandates that 'in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting the fraud or mistake shall be stated with such particularity as the circumstances may permit.' Failure to allege a specific element of fraud in a complaint is fatal when challenged by a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Strack v. Fred Rawn Const., Inc., 908 So. 2d 563, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

(16) Illegality: courts will refuse to enforce, as a matter of public policy, illegal contracts. See Armco Drainage and Metal Products, Inc. v. County of Pinellas, 137 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962) (describing in detail rationale of illegality defense); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(17) The "injury by fellow servant" defense precludes an employee’s recovery for damages where an injury is (a) caused by the negligence of the employee and in part through the negligence of a fellow employee, (b) both employees are jointly performing the act causing the injury and (c) the employer is not contributorily negligent. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co. v. Pittman, 130 Fla. 624, 178 So. 297, 298 (1938); see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(18) Judicial Estoppel precludes a party from asserting a proposition that is inconsistent with that alleged or admitted under oath in prior proceeding. Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061, 1066 (Fla. 2001).

(19) Laches is established when (a) conduct on the part of the defendant gives rise to the subject matter of the complaint; (b) the plaintiff has knowledge or notice of the conduct, but delays in bringing the complaint; (c) the defendant lacks knowledge or notice that plaintiff would assert the right on which he or she bases the complaint; and (d) the defendant will suffer injury or prejudice if relief is awarded to the plaintiff. See Florida Bar v. Lipman, 497 So. 2d 1165, 1167 (Fla. 1986); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(20) License is the right to take action that would otherwise be illegal. See Wyman v. Robbins, 513 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(21) Litigation privilege is an absolute immunity that covers both defamatory statements and other tortuous behavior during a judicial proceeding. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2001).

(22) Mootness requires that issues before the court remain "live," and that parties maintain a legally cognizable interest in the outcome throughout the litigation. See Montgomery v. Dept. of Health and Rehab. Servs., 468 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

(23) Payment is when the defendant has already satisfied the plaintiff’s claim through payment of money or discharge of obligation. See generally Blacks Law Dictionary, pg. 1129 (6th Ed. 1990); see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(24) Federal Preemption: The Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2) provides that state law claims are not available when preempted by federal law. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1087 (1996).

(25) Ratification occurs when a party with full knowledge of the material facts takes action to adopt an act or contract entered without authority. Zurstrassen v. Stonier, 786 So. 2d 65, 71 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2001).

(26) Release is the waiver or relinquishment of the right to bring a claim against a person or entity. See generally Blacks Law Dictionary, pg. 1289 (6th Ed. 1990); see also Bruce v. Heiman, 392 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(27) Res Judicata bars a second litigation when the same cause of action has already been litigated between the same parties by rendering the first judgment conclusive as to all matters that were or could have been adjudicated in the first action. See Acadia Partners, L.P. v. Tompkins, 759 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2000); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(28) Standing requires that the plaintiff have a sufficient interest at stake in the controversy that will be affected by the litigation’s outcome. See Provence v. Palm Beach Taverns, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); it must be asserted as an affirmative defense or the defense is waived. See Cowart v. City of West Palm Beach, 255 So. 2d 673, 674-675 (Fla. 1971); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210 (parties).

(29) Statute of Frauds: the Statute of Frauds bars the enforcement of oral contracts that cannot be performed within one year. See Smith v. Royal Automotive Group, Inc., 675 So. 2d 144, 154-155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (discussing Florida’s statute of frauds); see also §§ 678.319 (sale of securities), 680.201 (leasing), 672.201, 206 (Florida U.C.C.), 725.201 (payment of another’s debt), Fla. Stat.; Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 110, 130 (1981); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(30) Doctrine of Unclean Hands: plaintiffs who seek a remedy in equity with "unclean hands," which does not require the commission of a crime but only acts "condemned by honest and reasonable" persons, will be denied relief. Roberts v. Roberts, 84 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1956).

(31) Waiver requires that the plaintiff (a) possesses, at the time of the waiver, a right, privilege, advantage, or benefit (the "right"), which may be waived; (b) has actual or constructive knowledge of the right; and (c) has the intention to relinquish the right. Zurstrassen v. Stonier, 786 So. 2d 65, 70 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2001); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d), discussed in (1), above.

(32) Worker’s Compensation is an employee’s sole remedy for claims of injury or death absent intentional conduct by employer that is substantially certain to result in injury or death. § 440.11, Fla. Stat.; see Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. 1978).